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ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE MEASURES, 
THE SHRIMP-TURTLE RULINGS, 
AND THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE 
TEXT OF THE GATT 
Howard F. Chang1 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body issued 
the most important rulings to date on the status of 
environmental trade measures under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 in its 1998 report3 and 2001 report4 in 
the “shrimp-turtle” dispute.  At issue in this case was section 609 
of Public Law 101-162,5 a U.S. statute that the U.S. Court of 
International Trade had interpreted as a ban on shrimp imports 
from countries not certified by the United States as having 
adopted “a regulatory program governing the incidental taking 
of . . . sea turtles . . . that is comparable to that of the United 
States.”6  The United States adopted such a program to promote 
the conservation of sea turtles, which are endangered species.  
This program includes a requirement that U.S. trawlers use 
turtle excluder devices (TEDs) to protect sea turtles from 
 
 1 Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Copyright © 2005 by 
Howard F. Chang.  Parts of this article have appeared previously in a shorter essay by 
Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the 
Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31 (2000).  I wish to thank Robert Howse and 
participants at the Chapman University symposium, at a United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) seminar at Renmin University in Beijing, China, at the Association 
of American Law Schools (AALS) Conference on Environmental Law in Portland, Oregon, 
and at a symposium sponsored by the Association for Comparative Studies of Legal 
Cultures in Tokyo, Japan, for their helpful comments. 
 2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 
187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 3 Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) 
[hereinafter 1998 Appellate Body]. 
 4 Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products; Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Appellate Body]. 
 5 Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, Public Law 
101-162, sec. 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (Nov. 21, 1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note 
(1984)). 
 6 Id. sec. 609(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 1038; see Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 
942 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996), vacated, Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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incidental capture and drowning in shrimping nets.  India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand complained that the U.S. ban 
on shrimp imports violated GATT Article XI,7 which prohibits 
quantitative restrictions on imports, and requested that a WTO 
panel settle their dispute with the United States. 
Given the hostile attitude toward environmental trade 
measures reflected in past panel decisions under the GATT, the 
WTO Appellate Body’s 1998 ruling in the shrimp-turtle case 
represented a significant step toward more liberal treatment of 
these measures under the GATT.  In stark contrast to the 
consistent pattern in those past decisions, the Appellate Body 
upheld the statute in dispute and objected only to very specific 
aspects of its implementation.  The Appellate Body endorsed the 
general type of case-by-case review that I had proposed in my 
writings and thereby brought GATT case law much closer to a 
reasonable balance between environmental and trade interests.8  
The 1998 Appellate Body decision, as I have noted in prior 
writing about that ruling, suggests that countries can defend 
unilateral import bans as permissible environmental measures 
under the GATT as long as they avoid unfair discrimination.9  
The result was a decision much more sensitive to environmental 
interests than observers had expected. 
To comply with the Appellate Body’s decision, the U.S. State 
Department issued new guidelines in 1999 that addressed the 
problems identified by the Appellate Body in its 1998 report.10  
Malaysia nevertheless complained that the United States had 
not brought its policies into conformity with the 1998 ruling.  
Malaysia brought this complaint before the WTO, and in 2001, 
the Appellate Body held that the United States had complied 
with the 1998 Appellate Body decision, confirming that the U.S. 
import ban was consistent with the GATT despite the ban’s 
reliance on environmental standards unilaterally prescribed by 
the United States. 
The Appellate Body’s rulings in this dispute, however, have 
generated some confusion regarding the standard that WTO 
panels should apply to environmental trade measures in the 
 
 7 GATT, supra note 2, art. XI, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A32, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224. 
 8 See generally Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 
17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997) [hereinafter Chang, International Externalities]; 
Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global 
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995) [hereinafter Chang, Trade Measures]. 
 9 See Chang, supra note 1.  This article updates and expands upon the analysis that 
I presented in that essay. 
 10 See Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-
162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 
Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,948 (1999). 
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future.  In this article, I will suggest that the 2001 ruling by the 
Appellate Body confirms an interpretation of the 1998 shrimp-
turtle decision that preserves broad leeway for the use of 
environmental trade measures.  I will argue that a more 
restrictive interpretation of the shrimp-turtle rulings would be 
inconsistent with the Appellate Body’s close attention to the 
“ordinary meaning” of the text of the GATT in its legal reasoning. 
First, in Part I of this article, I will review the Appellate 
Body’s decisions in the shrimp-turtle cases, summarizing the 
Appellate Body’s rulings in both its 1998 and 2001 reports.  
Unlike prior dispute-settlement reports addressing 
environmental trade measures under the GATT, the Appellate 
Body in the shrimp-turtle cases emphasized the “ordinary 
meaning” of the text of the GATT.  This explicit focus on the 
treaty text implies better legal reasoning and more liberal 
treatment for environmental trade measures than we have seen 
in the past.  Second, in Part II, I consider three questions of 
interpretation that have generated disagreements among readers 
of the Appellate Body reports.  With respect to each issue, I argue 
that fidelity to the “ordinary meaning” of the text of the GATT 
requires the interpretation of those reports that gives WTO 
members greater freedom to use environmental trade measures. 
I. THE SHRIMP-TURTLE RULINGS 
The United States defended its ban on shrimp imports as a 
measure falling within GATT Article XX, which sets forth 
general exceptions from the obligations set forth elsewhere in the 
GATT.  In particular, Article XX states: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures: 
. . . . 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
. . . . 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption; 
. . . .11 
In May 1998, the WTO panel nevertheless ruled against the 
 
 11 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
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United States.12 
When the United States lost before the WTO panel in the 
shrimp-turtle case, it was the third time in a row that a dispute-
settlement panel had held that the United States had violated 
the GATT by banning imports harvested in a manner harmful to 
marine life.  Pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA),13 the United States has banned imports of tuna from 
countries that have not adopted programs to protect dolphins 
comparable to the U.S. program.  In 1991, and again in 1994, 
dispute-settlement panels held that the MMPA violated the 
GATT.14  Both those GATT panels, like the WTO panel in the 
shrimp-turtle case, ruled against the United States on grounds so 
general and sweeping that they left little scope for trade 
measures to protect the global environment.  The GATT Council, 
however, adopted neither of the “tuna-dolphin” panel reports, 
which therefore never became legally binding. 
A. The 1998 Appellate Body Ruling 
In the shrimp-turtle case, the United States appealed the 
panel’s ruling to the WTO Appellate Body, which in October 1998 
also ruled against the United States, but on much narrower 
grounds than the panel below.  In its ruling, the Appellate Body 
used much better legal reasoning than we have seen in past 
panel decisions, with much closer attention to the ordinary 
meaning of the language in GATT Article XX.  For example, in 
the shrimp-turtle case the panel below required that any 
measure allowed under Article XX must not be “a type of 
measure” that would “undermine the WTO multilateral trading 
system” if adopted by others,15 a requirement that echoes a 
concern expressed by both the 1991 and 1994 tuna-dolphin 
panels.16  In a striking departure from the pattern established by 
those past decisions, the Appellate Body explicitly rejects this 
requirement as “a test that finds no basis . . . in the text” of 
Article XX.17  The Appellate Body criticized the panel below for 
failing to examine “the ordinary meaning of the words of Article 
 
 12 See Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 
Panel]. 
 13 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994). 
 14 See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT 
Doc. DS29/R (May 20, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Panel]; Report of the 
Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Aug. 16, 
1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter 1991 Panel]. 
 15 1998 Panel, supra note 12, para. 7.44. 
 16 See 1994 Panel, supra note 14, para. 5.26; 1991 Panel, supra note 14, para. 5.27. 
 17 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121. 
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XX.”18  The Appellate Body stressed that “[a] treaty interpreter 
must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular 
provision to be interpreted,” looking beyond that text only 
“[w]here the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or 
inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the 
reading of the text itself is desired.”19  Thus, as John Knox has 
observed, the Appellate Body “decided that its starting point 
would always be the ordinary meaning of the text” and that it 
would “follow the ordinary meaning of the text before it as far as 
possible.”20  This emphasis on the “ordinary meaning” of the 
treaty text is itself significant, because each of the prior panel 
decisions ruled against the United States based on requirements 
that the panels invented without any support in the text of 
Article XX.21  Critics of those past decisions, including this 
author, have urged a more literal reading of Article XX, which 
implies a broader reading of the Article XX exceptions.22 
Turning to the question of whether section 609 is a measure 
“relating to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g), 
the Appellate Body in the shrimp-turtle case found  the “general 
design and structure” of section 609 to be “reasonably related” to 
a “legitimate policy” of conservation.23  The Appellate Body noted 
that section 609 “is not disproportionately wide in its scope and 
reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and 
conservation of sea turtle species.”24  The requirement that “a 
country adopt a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs,” 
according to the Appellate Body, “is . . . directly connected with 
the policy of conservation of sea turtles.”25  Thus, the Appellate 
Body concluded that section 609 “is a measure ‘relating to’ the 
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX(g).”26 
 
 18 Id. para. 115. 
 19 Id. para. 114. 
 20 John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the 
Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2004). 
 21 See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2145; Carrie Wofford, Note, A 
Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on Environmental 
Exceptions to GATT, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 573 (2000) (“Through a more literal 
interpretation of the text of Article XX, the Appellate Body has abandoned several 
tests . . . that prior panels had imposed . . . that had no basis in the actual language of 
Article XX.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2172-75; Robert Howse, The 
Turtles Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at 
73. 
 23 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 141. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. para. 140. 
 26 Id. para. 141.  Some observers have read the Appellate Body’s analysis to suggest 
a requirement of “proportionality,” so that a broader import ban might be 
“disproportionately wide” and thus fail to qualify as a measure “relating to” conservation 
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The Appellate Body carefully identified problems only in the 
way in which the executive branch applied this law to countries 
exporting shrimp.  In particular, the Appellate Body held that 
the executive branch applied section 609 “in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries,” which violates the 
requirements set forth in the  preamble, or “chapeau,” of Article 
XX.27  Thus, the Appellate Body avoided the use of any general 
per se rules against environmental trade measures like the 
sweeping rules announced by panels in the past.  Instead, the 
Appellate Body endorsed a case-by-case analysis that relies on 
the requirements explicit in the chapeau of Article XX to guard 
against the abuse of the Article XX exceptions,28 much as critics 
of past panel decisions, including this author, have proposed.29  
Given its case-specific approach, the opinion is explicit regarding 
precisely which particular features of the application of the trade 
measure in question were “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination.”  Furthermore, each objection pertains to a 
discriminatory aspect of the U.S. policy and is thus tied to the 
actual text of Article XX:30 
(1)  First, although section 609 permits some flexibility in 
determining whether an exporting country’s regulatory program 
is “comparable” to the U.S. program, in practice U.S. officials 
 
under Article XX(g).  See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle 
Case:  A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 491, 503 & n.33 (2002).  Others have inferred that the Appellate Body may require a 
“direct connection” between conservation and the measure in question.  See Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Trade and Environment after the Shrimp-Turtles Litigation, 34 J. WORLD 
TRADE, Feb. 2000, at 73, 84-85.  It would be inappropriate, however, to infer any 
additional requirements stricter or more demanding than the modest requirement 
actually set forth in the text of Article XX(g).  While the Appellate Body praises certain 
features of the section 609 import ban, it never states that these features are required by 
Article XX(g).  Given the ordinary meaning of the treaty language, “relating to” 
conservation, the features praised are certainly sufficient but hardly necessary to show 
that the measure satisfies that simple requirement.  The Appellate Body does not present 
its analysis as setting forth a new litmus test for measures “relating to” conservation.  
Instead, the Appellate Body praises these features merely to underscore how easily 
section 609 qualifies as a measure related to conservation. 
 27 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
 28 See 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 159 (endorsing a balance that “moves 
as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up 
specific cases differ”). 
 29 See, e.g., Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2172-75; Steve Charnovitz, The 
Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 513-15 (1993). 
 30 Although this attention to the text of Article XX represents an improvement over 
past panel decisions, some critics complain that the Appellate Body distorted the meaning 
of the term “discrimination.”  See, e.g., Benjamin Simmons, Note, In Search of Balance: 
An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
413, 445 (1999) (arguing that the Appellate Body “expanded the term ‘discrimination’ . . . 
to encompass all of its criticisms of the U.S. measure, including criticisms that have no 
relation to the plain meaning of ‘discrimination’”). 
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only looked at whether the country’s policies are “essentially the 
same” as U.S. policies.31  Officials did not take into account other 
policies and measures that the country may have adopted, nor 
did they consider different conditions that may exist in that other 
country.32  Because this rigid approach to certification could 
result in a ban on imports from a country with a different yet 
comparable program, the Appellate Body held that this 
inflexibility amounted to “arbitrary discrimination” among 
countries with comparable programs in violation of the chapeau 
of Article XX.33 
(2)  Second, the United States failed to engage in “serious” 
negotiations with all affected countries before imposing its 
import ban.34  The United States did negotiate with some 
countries to produce the Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, concluded in 1996, 
but not with other countries.35  The result was “unjustifiable” 
discrimination.36 
 
 31 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 163. 
 32 See id. para. 164. 
 33 Id. para. 177.  For a critique of this interpretation of the phrase “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination,” see Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article 
XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 739, 784-90 (2001).  See id. at 784 (arguing that the Appellate Body ruled 
against the United States “because it refused to discriminate in trade treatment between 
countries where different conditions may prevail,” which “is the exact converse of the 
chapeau language”); Simmons, supra note 30, at 443 (arguing that “there is no affirmative 
duty to discriminate where conditions between countries are different”).  The Appellate 
Body identified only the potential for discrimination among countries with equally 
effective conservation programs; it did not find such discrimination in actual practice as a 
matter of fact.  Gaines argues that “[a]t the very least, the Appellate Body needed to make 
a robust finding of fact that the shrimp fishing and sea turtle conditions in South Asian 
waters were different from those in the Caribbean or western Atlantic in ways that were 
significant for policies to reduce sea turtle mortality.”  Gaines, supra, at 786.  
Furthermore, Gaines argues that the United States could justify any discrimination 
resulting from an inflexible certification approach based on “considerations of 
administrative capacity,” which militate in favor of a “simplified approach.”  Id. at 788. 
 34 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 166. 
 35 See id. para. 171. 
 36 Id. para. 172.  For a critique of this interpretation of the term “discrimination,” see 
Gaines, supra note 33, at 805-07, 817-18.  First, Gaines argues that we should read the 
word “discrimination” in the Article XX chapeau to mean “only discrimination in trade.”  
Id. at 807.  Second, Gaines argues that any discrimination in negotiations caused 
“absolutely no discrimination in trade,” id. at 806, because the “negotiations had no effect 
on trade embargo decisions under Section 609,” id. at 817.  Furthermore, Gaines 
complains that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the Article XX chapeau implies that 
“the WTO sits in judgment of the wisdom of a member’s particular foreign policy 
strategy.”  Id. at 815.  Lakshman Guruswamy argues that the Appellate Body’s holding 
violates “the principle of state sovereignty by attempting to second-guess the manner in 
which the United States should have conducted treaty negotiations,” because “States 
possess the freedom to negotiate treaties as they deem proper” as “an essential attribute 
of sovereignty that gives rise to the corollary duty of other States or international 
organizations not to interfere with this power.”  Lakshman Guruswamy, The Annihilation 
of Sea Turtles:  World Trade Organization Intrasigence and U.S. Equivocation, 30 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,261, 10,267 (2000).  
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(3)  Third, the United States gave fourteen countries a three-
year phase-in period (1991-1994).  The United States did not 
impose an import ban on others until 1996, when it did so with 
only four-months notice.37  The shorter phase-in period was not 
only more burdensome but also accompanied by less effort by the 
United States to transfer TED technology to the exporting 
countries.38 
The Appellate Body held that the foregoing problems in the 
application of the statute “considered in their cumulative effect” 
were “unjustifiable discrimination” in violation of Article XX.39  
The phrase “in their cumulative effect” indicates that one of these 
defects standing alone would not necessarily render the U.S. 
policy inconsistent with the GATT.  Thus, had the United States 
discriminated among exporting countries only in terms of phase-
in periods or efforts to transfer technology, those discriminatory 
practices standing alone might not amount to “unjustifiable 
discrimination” within the meaning of Article XX. 
(4)  Finally, the Appellate Body complained that the U.S. 
certification process was not “transparent”:  that is, there is “no 
formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to 
respond to arguments . . . made against it,” “no formal written, 
reasoned decision” with reasons for a denial of certification, and 
“no procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial.”40  Thus, the 
United States denied certification without a process to ensure 
that the statute is “applied in a fair and just manner.”41  The 
Appellate Body concluded that denials under this procedure 
amount to “arbitrary discrimination” against those countries 
denied certification.42 
 
 37 See 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 174. 
 38 See id. para. 175. 
 39 Id. para. 176. 
 40 Id. para. 180.  For an insightful analysis of the requirement of transparency, see 
Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade 
Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1057-67 (1999). 
 41 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 181. 
 42 Id. para. 184; see id. para. 181.  For a critique of this interpretation of the term 
“discrimination,” see Gaines, supra note 33, at 824-25.  “Those who received certification 
were, after all, subject to the same non-transparent process as the others.  There is no 
claim of discrimination in the procedures followed or decision criteria applied; the only 
difference is the result.”  Id. at 824; see Knox, supra note 20, at 58 (“[I]t is hard to see how 
these procedures necessarily discriminated among applicant countries if . . . they were 
applied to all countries equally.”).  Although this process may have created the potential 
for arbitrary discrimination among countries with equally effective conservation 
programs, the Appellate Body did not find such discrimination in the administration of 
the statute as a matter of fact.  Gaines argues that “it was incumbent upon the Appellate 
Body to establish that there was discrimination in practice, not merely the procedural 
possibility” of “abusive discrimination.”  Gaines, supra note 33, at 824; see Axel Bree, 
Article XX GATT – Quo Vadis?  The Environmental Exception After the Shrimp/Turtle 
Appellate Body Report, 17 DICK. J. INT’L L. 99, 128 (1998) (“The existence of procedural 
CHANG FINAL 6/18/2005 1:48 PM 
33 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 8:25 
B.  The 2001 Appellate Body Ruling 
To comply with the 1998 Appellate Body ruling in the 
shrimp-turtle case, the United States began efforts to negotiate 
with the four complainants in the case, seeking an agreement on 
the conservation of sea turtles in the Indian Ocean region, as 
well as efforts to provide technical assistance to those countries 
to assist in the development of TED programs.  The U.S. State 
Department also issued new guidelines in 1999 to ensure 
consideration of evidence that an exporting country’s program for 
protecting sea turtles is comparable to the U.S. program in light 
of different conditions or the use of methods other than TED 
requirements and also to provide greater transparency and due 
process for nations seeking certification under section 609.43  
Malaysia nevertheless brought a complaint to the WTO claiming 
that section 609 violated the GATT despite these U.S. efforts to 
comply with the 1998 Appellate Body ruling.  The WTO panel 
reviewing U.S. implementation of that 1998 decision ruled in 
favor of the United States in 2001,44 and Malaysia appealed to 
the Appellate Body. 
First, Malaysia argued that to avoid unjustifiable 
discrimination, the United States had to conclude an 
international agreement before imposing an import ban.45  The 
Appellate Body rejected this suggestion, holding instead that the 
United States must show “good faith efforts to reach 
international agreements that are comparable from one forum of 
negotiation to the other.”46  These “negotiations need not be 
identical” or “lead to identical results.”47  Instead, “the 
negotiations must be comparable in the sense that comparable 
efforts are made, comparable resources are invested, and 
comparable energies are devoted to securing an international 
agreement.”48  The Appellate Body looked to the Inter-American 
Convention for comparison and found the United States had 
 
flaws . . . does not automatically indicate arbitrariness.”). 
 43 See Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 
101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 
Fed. Reg. 36,946 (July 8, 1999). 
 44 Report of the Panel, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Panel]. 
 45 See 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 115.  Some commentators took a 
similar view of the 1998 Appellate Body decision.  See, e.g., Gary P. Sampson, Effective 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Why the WTO Needs Them, 24 WORLD 
ECONOMY 1109, 1126 (2001) (claiming that the Appellate Body “found that . . . the failure 
to have established an environmental agreement . . . had resulted in unilateralism which 
was discriminatory and unjustifiable”). 
 46 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 122. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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made comparable efforts in the Indian Ocean region.49 
Second, Malaysia argued that the U.S. import ban still 
violated the GATT because it still required exporting countries to 
meet standards “unilaterally” prescribed by the United States.50  
The Appellate Body, however, found no problem with the United 
States “conditioning market access on the adoption of a 
programme comparable in effectiveness” to that adopted 
unilaterally by the United States.51  To require “a programme 
comparable in effectiveness” rather than “essentially the same 
programme” allows “sufficient flexibility . . . so as to avoid 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.’”52  By finally placing 
its stamp of approval on a unilateral import ban, the Appellate 
Body underscored how thoroughly it had rejected the reasoning 
advanced in the past by the tuna-dolphin panels. 
II. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE APPELLATE BODY RULINGS 
Given the ease with which the United States brought its 
unilateral import ban into compliance with the 1998 Appellate 
Body ruling, without even amending section 609,53 one might 
expect environmentalist critics of the tuna-dolphin decisions to 
celebrate the dramatic changes in the interpretation of GATT 
Article XX evident in the Appellate Body’s analysis.  Some critics, 
however, perceive little improvement in the prospects for 
environmental trade measures under the GATT.  Sanford 
Gaines, for example, argues that the 1998 Appellate Body ruling 
“continues the tradition of trade jurisprudence that has almost 
completely closed off the policy space Article XX should leave 
open for national trade measures designed to protect the 
environment.”54  The Appellate Body, he maintains, “gave little 
ground for hope that the WTO will tolerate any real-world 
unilateral use of trade leverage in furtherance of environmental 
protection objectives reaching beyond national boundaries.”55  
Gaines even claims that his “pessimistic assessment is confirmed 
 
 49 Id. para. 133. 
 50 Id. para. 135. 
 51 Id. para. 144. 
 52 Id. 
 53 To satisfy the Appellate Body regarding the flexibility of the U.S. certification criteria, for 
example, the United States needed to make only minor changes in its guidelines for the implementation 
of section 609.  As Sanford Gaines notes, the United States only had to leave open “the possibility and 
the process for an exporting country to rebut” the “presumption” in favor of the “same” regulatory 
approach as that of the United States.  Gaines, supra note 33, at 794.  “That possibility was, in fact, 
always there in the U.S. program.  The revised guidelines simply state it more explicitly.”  Id. 
 54 Gaines, supra note 33, at 773.  He complains that the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of the Article XX chapeau creates tests for non-discrimination that “become 
a proverbial ‘eye of the needle’ through which hardly any national environmental 
measures will be able to pass.”  Id. 
 55 Id. at 743-44 (emphasis added). 
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by the 2001 report of the WTO panel in the follow-on 
proceeding,”56 despite the fact that the 2001 panel upheld the 
section 609 import ban, an example of the type of “real-world 
unilateral use of trade leverage” about which he worries.  Even 
the 2001 Appellate Body ruling, which “takes some of the hard 
edges off the panel’s conclusions and . . . limits some of the 
damage,” according to Gaines, “imposes extraordinary 
preconditions on member governments before they resort to 
Article XX for environmental measures.”57 
While the shrimp-turtle rulings may well have imposed some 
unwarranted “preconditions” on the use of environmental trade 
measures, I will suggest that at least some of the concerns of 
environmentalist critics derive from an unduly broad 
interpretation of the “preconditions” set forth by the Appellate 
Body.  Ambiguities in the 1998 and 2001 Appellate Body reports 
have generated disagreements among observers regarding the 
correct interpretation of those decisions.  In particular, I will 
address three questions left open by those decisions and argue 
that in each case, fidelity to the “ordinary meaning” of the text of 
Article XX militates decisively in favor of the interpretation that 
leaves greater scope for the use of environmental trade measures. 
A. The Jurisdiction of the Importing Country 
The Appellate Body agreed that section 609 was a measure 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”58  
Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that the statute came 
within the exception in Article XX(g) despite the fact that section 
609 called for a unilateral ban on imports based on the process by 
which they were made or harvested outside the United States.  
These types of attempts to influence production and process 
methods (PPMs) outside the jurisdiction of the importing country 
have been anathema to many in the GATT community, and some 
have since expressed alarm that the Appellate Body decision 
apparently allows the use of these process standards.  Thailand, 
for example, complained that the decision “will result in an 
explosive growth in the number of environmental . . . measures 
applied to PPMs and justified pursuant to Article XX.”59 
Expressing similar concerns, the 1991 tuna-dolphin panel 
ruled that the MMPA could not come within the Article XX 
exceptions because it sought to protect dolphins from fishing 
 
 56 Id. at 744. 
 57 Id. at 745. 
 58 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 145 
 59 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Formally Adopts Shrimp-Turtle Ruling as Thailand Fears 
Victory May Be Pyrrhic, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1884, 1885 (Nov. 11, 1998). 
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fleets outside the jurisdiction of the United States.60  The 
Appellate Body holding in the shrimp-turtle case rejects that 
particular jurisdictional requirement, so it does not rule against 
the U.S. import ban because it seeks to protect sea turtles from 
activities outside U.S. jurisdiction.  The opinion, however, leaves 
open the question of whether there may be some jurisdictional 
limitation implicit in Article XX(g): 
We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied 
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or 
extent of that limitation.  We note only that in the specific 
circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus 
between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved 
and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g).61 
The opinion hints that it might be relevant that sea turtles 
migrate through U.S. territory, and consequently several 
commentators have suggested that such a nexus may be 
necessary to justify an environmental trade measure under 
Article XX(g).62 
The Appellate Body, however, expressly declines to rule on 
whether such a nexus is actually required, and the reasoning in 
the opinion militates against any such jurisdictional 
requirement.  Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the 
Appellate Body’s emphasis on the ordinary meaning of the text of 
Article XX.  In fact, the 1994 tuna-dolphin panel explicitly 
rejected any limitation on the scope of the Article XX(g) exception 
based on the location of the natural resources protected by the 
trade measure in question, because the panel found no such 
limitation in the text of Article XX(g).63  In the future, WTO 
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body should 
similarly reject any such jurisdictional requirement as a test 
with absolutely no basis in the text of Article XX.64 
 
 60 See 1991 Panel, supra note 14, paras. 5.25, .32, at 198, 200-01. 
 61 See 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 133. 
 62 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 40, at 1057 (“States may permissibly use trade 
measures to protect resources outside their territorial jurisdiction so long as . . . the state 
has a sufficient ‘nexus’ with those resources . . . .”); Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note, 
World Trade Organization: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. 118, 119 (1999) (suggesting that states may use trade 
measures to protect environmental resources in the global commons “so long as there is at 
least some jurisdictional relationship between those resources and that WTO Member”); 
Asif H. Qureshi, Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body, 48 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 199, 204 (1999) (reading the Appellate Body opinion as “stipulating the need 
for a nexus between the State and the object of environmental concern”); Simmons, supra 
note 30, at 440 (“[I]t remains unclear whether future panels will allow countries to 
implement measures protecting natural resources outside their jurisdiction.”); Wofford, 
supra note 21, at 584 (suggesting that “a nation may still need to prove that its territory 
is affected by the environmental concern” to clear “the hurdle of jurisdiction”). 
 63 See 1994 Panel, supra note 14, paras. 5.15, .20. 
 64 Robert Howse suggests that “[t]he question . . . of whether there is an implicit 
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As I have argued elsewhere, restrictions on imports produced 
by environmentally harmful processes may protect important 
resources wholly outside the jurisdiction of the importing 
country.65  Some countries may regulate their own fishing fleets 
to ensure that they provide optimal protection for marine 
resources, but as long as these regulations raise costs for the 
regulated producers and reduce their output, then these 
countries must also support these regulations with trade 
measures against imports harvested using harmful practices.  
Otherwise, these imports would displace sales of domestic 
products harvested subject to environmental regulation.  
Furthermore, fishing operations may move to unregulated 
countries in order to avoid these environmental regulations.  In 
the extreme, if imports displace sales by domestic producers 
entirely, then countries that regulate succeed only in destroying 
their domestic fishing industry without protecting the 
environment. 
By not only regulating the domestic fishing industry but also 
shielding it against those foreign competitors that use practices 
that harm the environment, a country can ensure that its efforts 
to change the practices of its own producers will not be in vain.  
Moreover, these trade measures protect the environment by 
inducing foreign fishing fleets to reform their practices in order 
to gain access to regulated markets.  Through these effects on 
both domestic and foreign fishing fleets, the application of a 
process standard to imports contributes to the protection of the 
global environment. 
B. The Environmental Policies of the Exporting Country 
In the shrimp-turtle case, however, the United States 
banned shrimp imports based not only on the processes used to 
harvest the particular shipment of shrimp in question but also on 
the environmental policies of the exporting country.  Therefore, 
the panel below ruled against the United States because it was 
“conditioning access to its market . . . upon the adoption . . . of 
 
territorial or jurisdictional limitation . . . may . . . be largely moot,” because “Article XX(g) 
by its explicit language only applies to environmental trade measures that are coupled 
with domestic environmental regulation.”  Howse, supra note 26, at 504.  The 
requirement in Article XX(g) that conservation measures be “made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption,” however, does not 
render the question of territorial jurisdiction moot.  Suppose, for example, the United 
States were to ban imports in an effort to protect an endangered marine species wholly 
outside U.S. territory.  A complainant could raise the question of a jurisdictional 
requirement even if the United States were to make that import ban effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic producers that threaten the species through 
their operations outside U.S. territory. 
 65 See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2177-78. 
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certain policies” by the exporting country’s government.66  The 
Appellate Body, however, explicitly and emphatically rejected 
this rationale as an “error in legal interpretation” with “no 
basis . . . in the text” of Article XX.67  Indeed, in paragraph 121 of 
its report, the Appellate Body even went so far as to declare that 
import bans based on whether the governments of exporting 
countries have adopted policies “unilaterally prescribed” by the 
importing country will be “a common aspect” of Article XX 
measures.68  In the same remarkable paragraph, the Appellate 
Body concluded that to consider such unilateral import bans “a 
priori incapable of justification” under Article XX would be 
“abhorrent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to 
apply,” because it would render “most, if not all, of the specific 
exceptions of Article XX inutile.”69 
Thus, the Appellate Body held that countries may 
unilaterally ban imports based not only on the process used in 
producing the particular units in question but also on the 
environmental policies of the targeted countries.  In support of its 
2001 complaint, Malaysia argued that paragraph 121 of the 1998 
Appellate Body ruling was mere dicta, but the Appellate Body 
firmly and emphatically rejected this suggestion in its 2001 
ruling.70  In case there remained any doubt regarding the 
significance of paragraph 121 of the 1998 ruling, the Appellate 
Body quotes that paragraph at length and proclaims that it 
“expresses a principle that was central to our ruling” in the 
shrimp-turtle case.71  Thus, the Appellate Body leaves no doubt 
that GATT Article XX allows countries to impose a unilateral 
import ban broader than a mere process standard. 
The 1994 tuna-dolphin panel cited the country-wide breadth 
of the import ban imposed by the MMPA as the reason that it 
ruled against the United States.  The 1994 panel inferred that 
the United States banned tuna imports “so as to force other 
countries to change their policies” and held explicitly that those 
import bans therefore fell outside Article XX.72  The Appellate 
Body made a similar inference regarding the purpose of the U.S. 
ban on shrimp imports, but did not hold that the U.S. measure 
 
 66 1998 Panel, supra note 12, para. 7.45. 
 67 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, paras. 121-122. 
 68 Id. para. 121. 
 69 Id. 
 70 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 138 (“Contrary to what Malaysia 
suggests, this statement is not ‘dicta.’”). 
 71 Id.; see id. para. 137 (quoting 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121, at 
length and adding emphasis). 
 72 1994 Panel, supra note 14, para. 5.27. 
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therefore falls outside Article XX.73  On the contrary, the 
Appellate Body instead declared that “a requirement that a 
country adopt a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs” is 
“directly connected with the policy of conservation of sea 
turtles.”74  Thus, consistent with the ordinary meaning of the text 
of Article XX, the Appellate Body’s opinion permits import bans 
designed to change the policies of other governments.  In fact, the 
Appellate Body does not rule out the possibility that even trade 
sanctions imposed with respect to products completely unrelated 
to the marine resource in question may fall within Article XX if 
they are intended to induce other countries to improve their 
efforts at conservation of that resource.75 
Importing countries can promote important environmental 
objectives by requiring exporting countries to improve their 
conservation efforts as a condition for access to domestic market 
of the importing country.76  When process standards alone are 
not effective in promoting more environmentally sound practices 
or policies, broader import bans are often useful in inducing other 
countries to join multilateral agreements and to comply with 
them.77  Other countries who harm the environment must have 
some reason to come to the negotiating table and to sign an 
agreement, especially given the powerful economic incentives for 
them to “free ride” on the restraint exercised by the countries 
that do agree to regulate.78  The types of trade measures 
condemned by past panels can create the incentives necessary for 
countries to join a multilateral agreement that imposes 
 
 73 See Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article XX of GATT 
and the Trade and Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (1999) 
(noting that the Appellate Body “implicitly rejected” the reasoning of the 1994 panel). 
 74 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 140; see Susan L. Sakmar, Free Trade 
and Sea Turtles: The International and Domestic Implications of the Shrimp-Turtles Case, 
10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345, 345 (1999) (concluding that a WTO member may 
“impose its domestic environmental regulations on another member so long as certain 
safeguards are met”). 
 75 For a defense of such trade sanctions, see Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 
2199-207. 
 76 For a comprehensive study of the role of import bans in promoting dolphin 
conservation, see Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the 
Global Commons: What We Can Learn From the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 77 Broader import bans may also discourage environmentally harmful production 
processes more effectively than process standards, even without changing the 
environmental policies of foreign governments, because broader import bans make it even 
more difficult for the producers using those harmful processes to find markets where they 
can sell their products at a profit.  See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2178-84. 
 78 We can reward countries that regulate with “carrots,” or we can threaten the use 
of “sticks” against those who do not.  The prospect of “carrots,” however, would create 
perverse incentives to  harm the environment.  See Chang, International Externalities, 
supra note 8; Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2150-60. 
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environmental regulations on them.79 
Despite the Appellate Body’s endorsement of country-based 
import bans in paragraph 121 of its 1998 ruling, the shrimp-
turtle litigation has left some doubts regarding the permissible 
scope of these import bans.  The 1998 Appellate Body opinion 
acknowledges explicitly that while the dispute was before the 
panel and the Appellate Body, the United States excluded even 
shrimp caught using TEDs if the shrimp came from countries not 
certified by the United States, and the Appellate Body expresses 
some concern about this ban in paragraph 165 of its opinion, 
suggesting that “[t]he resulting situation is difficult to reconcile 
with the declared policy objective of protecting and conserving 
sea turtles.”80  Some observers have concluded that the U.S. 
import ban violated the GATT because it applied even to imports 
that themselves were harvested by environmentally friendly 
processes. 
The question has been moot since 1998, when the U.S. State 
Department adopted a policy allowing shrimp imports if the 
individual shipment was caught with the use of TEDs, after the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated on 
procedural grounds an earlier decision by the U.S. Court of 
International Trade that had prohibited such imports.81  The 
State Department issued final guidelines in 1999 that affirmed 
this “shipment-by-shipment exception.”82  Environmentalists 
continued to advocate a “country-by-country” import ban, 
however, arguing that a “shipment-by-shipment” approach would 
be ineffective in protecting sea turtles,83 and the U.S. Court of 
 
 79 See Chang, Trade Measures, supra note 8, at 2146-60.  There are, of course, 
devices other than trade measures that can induce the cooperation of foreign 
governments, and a GATT prohibition on import bans would not render the use of other 
sanctions illegal.  Nevertheless, many of these other sanctions may sacrifice other 
important interests or often have little effect on the governments of particular countries.  
Because other sanctions on behalf of the environment may be costly or ineffective, trade 
restrictions have proven particularly useful instruments in protecting environmental 
interests.  See id. at 2149; Chang, International Externalities, supra note 8, at 323-24. 
 80 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 165. 
 81 See Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign 
Programs for the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 46,094, 46,094-95 (1998); Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), vacating Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996). 
 82 Rossella Brevetti, State Department Issues Guidelines to Comply with WTO 
Shrimp Ban Ruling, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1183 (July 14, 1999). 
 83 Rossella Brevetti, USTR to Consult with Interested Parties on How to Respond to 
Shrimp Ruling, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1768, 1768-69 (Oct. 21, 1998).  Critics of the 
shipment-by-shipment approach complain that it undermines “the incentive to create a 
national program” and encourages “countries with existing national programs to abandon 
their all-encompassing programs.”  Jennifer A. Bernaz, Note, The Eagle, the Turtle, the 
Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures, 15 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 207, 229 (2000). 
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International Trade ruled in favor of environmentalist plaintiffs 
again in 2000, holding that section 609 permits the importation 
of wild shrimp only from certified nations.84  Malaysia claimed in 
its 2001 complaint that this ruling put the United States out of 
compliance with the GATT as interpreted by the 1998 Appellate 
Body decision, but both the panel and the Appellate Body 
rejected Malaysia’s claim because the Court of International 
Trade did not issue an injunction pending appeal, so that the 
shipment-by-shipment exception continued to allow imports 
caught using TEDs.85  Thus, Malaysia did not prevail with this 
claim, but the Appellate Body’s basis for rejecting this claim in 
2001 leaves open the substantive question of whether a country-
based import ban would violate the GATT in the absence of a 
shipment-by-shipment exception. 
Some commentators agree with Malaysia’s reading of the 
1998 Appellate Body ruling on this issue.  Eric Richards and 
Martin McCrory, for example, claimed that by ruling against the 
shipment-by-shipment exception, the Court of International 
Trade could “sabotage United States compliance efforts.”86  They 
interpret the shrimp-turtle ruling to imply that the use of “trade 
leverage to force similar regulations on . . . trading partners” 
would “run afoul of GATT rules.”87  To support this claim, they 
quote passages in paragraph 161 of the 1998 ruling stating that 
“[p]erhaps the most conspicuous flaw” in the “application” of 
section 609 “relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on 
the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments.”88  
Adopting a similar view of this language from the 1998 ruling, 
Sanford Gaines complains that “[b]y disqualifying . . . any 
measure that has the result of applying the economic pressure of 
 
 84 See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2000).  The Federal Circuit would later overturn this decision on appeal in 2002 
and uphold the shipment-by-shipment exception.  See Turtle Island Restoration Network 
v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc denied, 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1748 (2003). 
 85 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 151 (holding that “the Panel took into 
account the status of municipal law at the time, and reached the correct conclusion”). 
 86 Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for 
Sovereignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 325 
(2000). 
 87 Id. at 333; see Brooks Ware, Staying Out of the Grasp of the GATT: Attempts to 
Protect Animals at the Expense of Free Trade, CURRENTS, Winter 1998, at 69, 73 (“Section 
609 ran afoul of Article XX because the U.S. had been excluding shrimp caught with 
TEDs simply because the country where the shrimp were caught had not been ‘certified’ 
by section 609.”). 
 88 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 161; see Richards & McCrory, supra note 
86, at 321.  As a result of these passages, some observers consider the legality of a 
country-by-country import ban “not so clear.”  Rosella Brevetti, U.S. Examining Ways to 
Make Restrictions on Shrimp Imports More Transparent, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 309, 
310 (Feb. 24, 1999) (quoting one source as stating that the Appellate Body’s decision “is 
kind of grey” on this issue). 
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a trade restriction on other governments unless they change 
their resource conservation policies, the Appellate Body 
effectively nullified Article XX(g).”89  Sydney Cone also infers 
that the Appellate Body deemed a country-by-country import ban 
to be a violation of the GATT.90  Therefore, Cone criticizes the 
Appellate Body, which he believes “seems to have lost sight of its 
own statement . . . that there is a reasonable relationship 
between the US rules . . . ‘and the legitimate policy of conserving 
an . . . endangered species.’”91 
If we read the Appellate Body’s 1998 decision as criticizing 
the United States for imposing a country-by-country ban, then 
this criticism would indeed be inconsistent with earlier passages 
in the same opinion, including paragraph 121, which the 
Appellate Body would later emphasize so forcefully in 2001.92  If 
we read each of the Appellate Body’s critical sentences carefully 
in context, however, we find that each sentence is followed 
immediately by an explanation that makes clear that the 1998 
ruling did not object to a country-by-country import ban per se.  
Instead, the Appellate Body’s specific complaint in paragraph 
165 is that the United States applies this import ban to induce 
other countries to adopt “essentially the same comprehensive 
regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its 
domestic shrimp trawlers” even though many of these countries 
“may be differently situated,” and the Appellate Body objects to 
the import ban on these narrower grounds instead.93  Similarly, 
 
 89 Gaines, supra note 33, at 804; see Bree, supra note 42, at 122 (“[I]t remains 
questionable whether the underlying rationale of pushing other countries to adopt policies 
is permissible.”). 
 90 See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Appellate Body, the Protection of Sea Turtles and the 
Technique of “Completing the Analysis,” J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1999, at 51, 53, 55, 58. 
 91 Id. (quoting Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 141).  Cone complains that “the 
Appellate Body ignored the difficult question of whether vessel-specific (as opposed to 
country-by-country) enforcement of the US regulations would be too limited” to protect 
sea turtles.  Id. at 58; see Bree, supra note 42, at 122-23 (“Case by case decisions about the 
import of particular shrimps depending on . . . how they are fished are not verifiable and 
enforceable, and thus would lead to the failure of the conservation objective . . . .”); 
Neuling, supra note 73, at 47 (complaining that “the suggestion that the U.S. Government 
should not exclude shrimp caught with TEDs” will limit “the ability of the U.S. 
Government to influence environmental practices abroad” and that “any system relying 
on shipment-by-shipment inspections . . . would be vulnerable to fraud”). 
 92 See Howse, supra note 26, at 513 (“To say that the chapeau requires shipment-by-
shipment inspection . . . would be to interpret the chapeau in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the [Appellate Body’s] overall understanding of the structure and 
purpose of Article XX, as articulated in paragraph 121 of its original ruling, and 
reaffirmed with emphasis in paragraph 138 of its [2001] ruling.”). 
 93 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 165 (noting that “shrimp caught using 
methods identical to those employed in the United States have been excluded from the 
United States market solely because they have been caught in waters of countries that 
have not been certified by the United States” and concluding from this fact that “this 
measure, in its application, is more concerned with effectively influencing WTO Members 
to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the 
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this inflexibility is the particular aspect of the “coercive effect” of 
the section 609 import ban that disturbs the Appellate Body in 
paragraph 161.94 
Thus, at most, the absence of a shipment-by-shipment 
exception is merely an aggravating circumstance that contributes 
to the “arbitrary and unjustifiable” nature of the discrimination 
that may result from an inflexible certification process.95  That is, 
the absence of such an exception is not itself a violation of any 
requirement in Article XX.  Observers have drawn a contrary 
conclusion only by taking isolated statements from the 1998 
Appellate Body ruling out of context.96 
The Appellate Body has never claimed that Article XX 
requires a shipment-by-shipment exception.97  The Appellate 
Body made no such claim, for the simple reason that such a claim 
would have no plausible basis in the ordinary meaning of the text 
of Article XX.  The Appellate Body could not derive such a claim 
from its analysis of the Article XX chapeau, for example, without 
distorting the ordinary meaning of the phrase “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail.”98  While a country-by-country import ban 
 
United States”); see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
 94 See id. para. 161 (criticizing the embargo for requiring other countries “to adopt 
essentially the same policy . . . as that applied to . . . United States domestic shrimp 
trawlers”).  Thus,  as Gaines recognizes, “[t]wo intertwined thoughts” prompted the 
Appellate Body’s conclusion that  the U.S. import ban had a “coercive effect” that 
produced “unjustifiable discrimination.” Gaines, supra note 33, at 791.  Both the rigid 
application of the certification criteria, requiring policies identical to those of the United 
States, and the use of trade measures to induce other governments to comply with those 
criteria combined to produce “unjustifiable discrimination.”  Id. 
 95 The 2001 panel addressed the shipment-by-shipment exception as if it were a 
separate requirement distinct from the requirement of greater flexibility in the 
certification criteria applied to exporting countries by the United States.  See 2001 Panel, 
supra note 44, para. 5.106.  Robert Howse suggests that the United States did not appeal 
this aspect of the 2001 panel’s interpretation of the 1998 Appellate Body ruling because 
the executive branch of the U.S. government found that interpretation useful in defending 
the shipment-by-shipment exception in federal court.  See Howse, supra note 26, at 512. 
 96 See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 507, 511 (1999).  Shaffer quotes paragraph 165 as 
identifying the absence of a shipment-by-shipment exception as a second flaw in the U.S. 
import ban, separate from the first flaw, which was the application of inflexible criteria 
requiring exporting countries “to adopt essentially the same policy” as that adopted by the 
United States.  Id.  His quote from paragraph 165, however, omits the language in that 
paragraph identifying the inflexibility of the U.S. criteria, which required “essentially the 
same” conservation policies as those adopted by the United States, as the fundamental 
problem.  1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 165.  This omitted language makes 
clear that the objection raised in paragraph 165 is merely an elaboration of the flaw of 
inflexibility identified in the preceding paragraphs, not a separate independent flaw. 
 97 See Howse, supra note 26, at 512 (noting that “shipment-by-shipment inspection 
was not presented as a separate requirement implicit in the chapeau” in the 1998 
Appellate Body ruling, nor does it appear “as a separate sine qua non requirement” in the 
2001 Appellate Body ruling). 
 98 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
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without a shipment-by-shipment exception might discriminate 
between producers harvesting shrimp using similar processes, 
this discrimination does not entail any discrimination between 
countries “where the same conditions prevail.”99 
The only aspect of the substantive criteria used by the 
United States to ban imports that the Appellate Body could 
plausibly describe as “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail” was the inflexibility of the U.S. certification criteria, 
which raised the possibility of discrimination between countries 
with comparably effective conservation policies.  Once the United 
States eliminated this inflexibility, those criteria were no longer 
a means of any discrimination that the WTO could condemn 
under the Article XX chapeau.  Therefore, the United States can 
apply a country-by-country import ban as long as it allows an 
exporting country to argue that it is “differently situated” so that 
its program for the protection of sea turtles may be certified as 
“comparable” to that of the United States.100  Thus, the United 
States would be in compliance with the GATT even if it were to 
return to a country-by-country import ban under section 609, 
because it has already revised its guidelines to allow for this 
more flexible approach to certification. 
C. Unilateral Measures Without Multilateral Negotiations 
The Appellate Body’s critique of the U.S. implementation of 
section 609 has also generated some commentary suggesting that 
“it is generally not acceptable for one WTO Member to restrict 
trade based on the failure of other Members to conform their 
natural resource conservation . . . policies to the unilateral 
dictates of that WTO Member.”101  Richards and McCrory, for 
example, assert that it is “permissible for a country to adopt 
 
 99 As the Appellate Body itself implied in its 1998 ruling, either “the same 
conditions” do not prevail between countries with conservation policies that are not 
comparably effective or discrimination between such countries is generally not “arbitrary 
or unjustifiable.”  To hold otherwise, according to paragraph 121 of that ruling, would be 
“abhorrent,” because it would render “most, if not all, of the specific exceptions of Article 
XX inutile.”  1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121. 
 100 See Joseph Robert Berger, Note, Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the 
World’s Living Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough for the GATT in the WTO Sea 
Turtle Case, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 355, 376 (1999) (noting that “[t]he WTO focused on 
the combination of the nationwide approach with the imposition of an inflexible, 
comprehensive regulatory program on all targeted nations” and suggesting that “[i]f the 
United States can address the latter problem,” then “the nationwide embargo approach 
might be accepted”) (emphasis added).  Peter Fugazzotto of the Earth Island Institute has 
expressed the view that the shipment-by-shipment approach is not necessary for 
compliance with the Appellate Body ruling, but he concedes that “[w]hether the Asian 
nations agree with that remains to be seen.”  Brevetti, supra note 88, at 310. 
 101 Perkins, supra note 62, at 119. 
CHANG FINAL 6/18/2005 1:48 PM 
45 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 8:25 
unilateral measures” only “in rare circumstances.”102  They cite 
the discussion in the 1998 Appellate Body report of the general 
preference for multilateral solutions to international 
environmental problems over unilateral actions.103  In paragraph 
171 of that report, for example, the Appellate Body points to the 
Inter-American Convention as evidence that “an alternative 
course of action” featuring “cooperative efforts” rather than “the 
unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import 
prohibition” under section 609 “was reasonably open to the 
United States.”104 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body’s 1998 opinion 
carefully avoids the suggestion that unilateral measures 
generally fall outside Article XX.  Such a claim would be 
inconsistent with passages in paragraph 121 of the same opinion 
implying that such a rule would render “most, if not all, of the 
specific exceptions of Article XX inutile” and thus would be 
“abhorrent.”105  Such a claim would also be inconsistent with the 
use of the singular noun in Article XX, which permits “any 
contracting party” to adopt the measures in question, and with 
GATT case law, which has often found unilateral measures to fall 
within Article XX.106  Nothing in the language of Article XX 
suggests that unilateral measures are illegal if they are directed 
at resources outside the jurisdiction of the importing country. 
Opposing views of the Appellate Body’s 1998 ruling have 
produced opposing views of the Appellate Body’s 2001 ruling, 
which required the United States “to make good faith efforts to 
reach international agreements that are comparable from one 
forum of negotiation to the other.”107  Robert Howse reads this 
statement to require the United States only “to negotiate 
 
 102 Richards & McCrory, supra note 86, at 340-41. 
 103 See id. at 322 (quoting 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, paras. 168, 171). 
 104 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 171; see Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: 
Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 477, 493 (1999) (concluding that the “need for a 
co-operative as opposed to a unilateral approach is among the central points of the 
Appellate Body’s finding that the US measure constituted unjustifiable discrimination”); 
Bree, supra note 42, at 125 (concluding that “unilateral measures are not permissible”).  
Thus, Charles Arden-Clarke of the World Wide Fund for Nature International complained 
that the Appellate Body ruling “still prevents countries from taking unilateral action on 
the global commons when irreversible environmental damage takes place.”  WTO Appeals 
Body Faults Implementation of Shrimp-Turtle Law, 15 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698, 1699 
(Oct. 14, 1998). 
 105 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121; see Sakmar, supra note 74, at 383 (noting 
that “the WTO Appellate Body . . . recognized that unilateral measures aimed at 
protecting the environment could be valid,” because “if such measures were not valid, the 
exceptions found in Article XX would be superfluous”); Wofford, supra note 21, at 581 
(“[T]he Appellate Body asserted that unilateral environmental policies are not only 
legitimate, but also to be expected under Article XX exceptions.”). 
 106 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
 107 2001 Appellate Body, supra note 4, para. 122. 
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seriously with the complainants exactly to the extent it had 
already negotiated with the western hemisphere countries, no 
more and no less.”108  That is, the Appellate Body does not impose 
“a self-standing duty to negotiate” independent of the duty not to 
discriminate in these efforts.109  “The ‘unjustified discrimination’ 
was not the failure to negotiate as such, but the failure to treat 
the complainants as well as . . . the western hemisphere 
countries.”110  Thus, had the United States “negotiated with no 
one, it would not have run afoul of the chapeau.”111 
John Knox, however, reads the same statement from the 
2001 ruling to express two separate requirements:  “(1) to make 
good faith efforts to negotiate international agreements; and (2) 
to make sure that the efforts are comparable across the board.”112  
That is, the Article XX chapeau required the United States to 
negotiate with the 1998 complainants not only to avoid 
discrimination against them but also to pursue the “multilateral 
‘alternative course of action’” urged in paragraph 171 of the 1998 
Appellate Body ruling.113  Based on a similar reading of the 
Appellate Body rulings, Gaines worries that “unilateral measures 
affecting transnational or global resources outside the context of 
any systematic effort to promote a multilateral solution will, ipso 
facto, not qualify under Article XX.”114 
Furthermore, Gaines complains, the Appellate Body has left 
open the “problematic” question of what “efforts, resources, and 
 
 108 Howse, supra note 26, at 508. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 508-09. 
 111 Id. at 509 n.39. 
 112 Knox, supra note 20, at 41 n.165. 
 113 Id. at 42 n.165; see Bree, supra note 42, at 123 (concluding that the 1998 Appellate 
Body decision “required serious negotiations before taking unilateral action as a last 
resort”).  Knox claims that the 2001 panel took a similar view of the 1998 Appellate Body 
ruling.  See Knox, supra note 20, at 41 n.165 (citing 2001 Panel, supra note 44, paras. 
5.59, .74, .76.).  Gaines agrees, noting that the 2001 Appellate Body report “does not 
specifically comment on, much less disavow, the panel’s extreme interpretation of the 
‘requirement’ for prior effort at multilateral solutions before invoking Article XX rights.”  
Gaines, supra note 33, at 818-19.  Knox infers from the Appellate Body’s silence that it 
agrees with the 2001 panel’s reading of the 1998 Appellate Body ruling.  Knox, supra note 
20, at 41 n.165 (“If Howse were right, surely the Appellate Body would have corrected the 
panel’s basic mischaracterization of its earlier decision.”).  The 2001 panel decision, 
however, is not much clearer than the 1998 Appellate Body ruling on this question.  Both 
decisions impose a duty to negotiate upon the United States, but neither makes clear 
whether this duty arises only because the United States had already negotiated with 
some countries or because such a duty exists even in the absence of any discrimination 
among exporting countries.  In any event, the 2001 Appellate Body report, as Gaines 
reads it, “shifts the emphasis away from ‘prior’ recourse to a more mundane concern with 
the perceived discrimination in treatment between the Western Hemisphere nations and 
the Asian nations in United States diplomacy.”  Gaines, supra note 33, at 819.  According 
to Howse, that report “clarified” that there is no self-standing duty to negotiate.  Howse, 
supra note 26, at 509 n.39. 
 114 Gaines, supra note 33, at 819. 
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energies” would “satisfy the implicit . . . general requirement . . . 
that there must always be a good faith effort at negotiations 
before invoking Article XX rights.”115  What standard would a 
WTO panel apply in the absence of any discrimination among 
exporting countries?  If the Appellate Body has indeed imposed a 
duty to negotiate on WTO members invoking Article XX(g), then 
it has also saddled WTO panels with the difficult task of 
developing an appropriate standard with little guidance on the 
question:  How much of a diplomatic effort must the importing 
country make before resorting to unilateral import restrictions?  
Howse infers from the Appellate Body’s silence on this question 
that there is no such independent duty to negotiate before 
invoking Article XX, arguing that had the Appellate Body 
“intended to read into the chapeau a self-standing duty to 
negotiate seriously, it would have given some guidance as to the 
extent of the duty.”116 
Most important, once we recall the Appellate Body’s focus on 
the ordinary meaning of the text of Article XX, we cannot 
reasonably read the Appellate Body’s rulings to impose a duty to 
negotiate in the absence of any “discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail.”117  There is simply no basis 
in the text of Article XX for any such duty.  As Gaines observes, 
“the text of Article XX makes no explicit reference to unilateral or 
multilateral action.”118  Indeed, “[n]othing in the lettered 
paragraphs or the chapeau constrains a member government’s 
choice among multilateral, regional, bilateral, or unilateral 
approaches.”119 
The only provision in Article XX that the Appellate Body ever 
identifies as imposing a duty to negotiate on the United States is 
the chapeau language against “discrimination,” and as Gaines 
 
 115 Id.; see id. at 805 (noting that the 1998 Appellate Body report “sets no definable, 
predictable standard for determining how much effort at negotiations will satisfy the 
WTO”); Neuling, supra note 73, at 47 (noting that the 1998 Appellate Body report does 
not address the question of “how much of a diplomatic effort must the importing nation 
make?”). 
 116 Howse, supra note 26, at 508. 
 117 We should distinguish negotiations from those discussions that may be necessary 
to avoid discrimination among countries with comparably effective conservation 
programs.  The Appellate Body required a country imposing an import ban to consider 
whether the conservation policies of the exporting country are as effective as those of the 
importing country.  This requirement may entail some discussions between the importing 
country and the exporting country but does not imply that the importing country must 
negotiate a compromise with the exporting country over the appropriate level of 
effectiveness for these conservation policies. 
 118 Gaines, supra note 33, at 807.  “Nor does the language of Article XX offer any 
basis from which to infer that multilateral action is a chapeau precondition for national 
measures.”  Id. 
 119 Id. 
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notes, “[t]here is no inherent connection between unilateralism 
and discrimination.”120  He complains that the Appellate Body 
“articulates no historical foundation or legal basis for the 
conclusion that failure to make bona fide efforts to negotiate a 
treaty comes within the chapeau’s concept of ‘unjustifiable’ 
discrimination.”121  Thus, Gaines takes the Appellate Body to 
task for imposing the “condition that unilateral measures under 
Article XX can only be taken after serious efforts at multilateral 
negotiations.”122 
The ordinary meaning of the text of Article XX, however, is 
not a reason to criticize the Appellate Body for imposing this 
condition as much as it is a reason to reject the notion that the 
Appellate Body ever imposed this condition at all.  After all, as 
Howse notes, the Appellate Body “never held that the 
requirements of the chapeau, in and of themselves, impose a sui 
generis duty to negotiate.”123  Given the lack of any textual basis 
for such a duty, and in the absence of any explicit statement by 
the Appellate Body imposing such a duty, we should not readily 
infer such a duty from the Appellate Body’s rulings.  This 
supposed duty to negotiate is implausible as an interpretation of 
the Appellate Body rulings precisely because it is implausible as 
an interpretation of Article XX. 
Knox points to paragraph 171 of the 1998 ruling, in which 
the Appellate Body contrasts the multilateral “alternative course 
of action” with “the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of 
the import prohibition,” as support for a duty to negotiate before 
imposing a unilateral import ban.124  If we read paragraph 171 as 
a whole, however, and especially if we view it in context rather 
than in isolation, we find that the Appellate Body points to this 
multilateral alternative to underscore the feasibility of serious 
negotiations with all affected parties rather than only some and 
to demonstrate that this discrimination in diplomatic efforts was 
“unjustifiable.”125  That is, the Appellate Body points to the Inter-
American Convention and this “cooperative” alternative only to 
criticize the failure of the United States “to negotiate similar 
agreements with any other country or group of countries.”126 
 
 120 Id. at 805. 
 121 Id.; see Simmons, supra note 30, at 444 (“[T]here is currently no mandate within 
the GATT to engage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations prior to taking unilateral 
actions.”). 
 122 Gaines, supra note 33, at 814. 
 123 Howse, supra note 26, at 507. 
 124 Knox, supra note 20, at 41 n.165. 
 125 See Howse, supra note 26, at 507-08.  Paragraph 172 in particular is quite explicit 
in relating “unilateralism” to the “unjustifiable nature of this discrimination” in 
negotiating efforts.  1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 172. 
 126 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 171. 
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Knox concedes that the text of Article XX “provides no 
apparent link” to “the principle of multilateralism.”127  Thus, he 
can derive an independent duty to negotiate from the Appellate 
Body opinions only by claiming that the Appellate Body “read the 
chapeau as giving it broad powers to strike a balance, or find a 
‘line of equilibrium,’ between trade and environmental 
interests.”128  In support of this claim, he quotes paragraph 159 of 
the 1998 Appellate Body ruling.129  This paragraph describes 
“[t]he task of interpreting and applying the chapeau” as 
“essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of 
equilibrium between the right of a [WTO] Member to invoke an 
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other 
Members.”130 
This paragraph, however, does not suggest that the 
Appellate Body has given itself broad powers to distort the 
ordinary meaning of the text of the chapeau or to replace treaty 
language with a balancing test.  After all, the Appellate Body 
describes itself as locating “a line of equilibrium” only in the 
course of “interpreting and applying the chapeau.”  Thus, the 
quoted passage merely acknowledges that when the Appellate 
Body interprets certain words in the chapeau, such as “arbitrary” 
and “unjustifiable,” and applies them to specific facts, their 
precise meaning will invariably be subject to dispute, because 
reasonable minds can differ on the precise meaning of such 
words.  In choosing among different plausible interpretations of 
 
 127 Knox, supra note 20, at 56-57.  He does suggest, however, that “relying on rigid 
unilateral measures in the absence of attempts to find a multilateral solution to regional 
or global environmental problems could be seen as unjustifiable discrimination against 
other countries in favor of the country applying the trade restriction,” because “the failure 
to take into account the views and interests of other affected countries could lead to a 
presumption that the resulting unilateralism will unjustifiably discriminate against those 
interests.”  Id. at 65.  If Knox uses the term “rigid” to refer to the inflexibility in 
certification criteria that the 1998 Appellate Body ruling condemned, then an importing 
country can avoid “unjustifiable discrimination” by eliminating this inflexibility, just as 
the United States did with respect to section 609, rather than by attempting to negotiate 
a multilateral agreement.  If Knox has a broader notion of “rigid” in mind, on the other 
hand, then his suggestion must deem countries with conservation policies that are not 
comparably effective to be “countries where the same conditions prevail” in the sense 
relevant under the chapeau.  This interpretation of the chapeau, however, would give the 
phrase “where the same conditions prevail” virtually no effect in restricting the type of 
“discrimination” prohibited by the chapeau.  Furthermore, this interpretation of “same 
conditions” would seem to be at odds with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in the 
shrimp-turtle rulings, which deems countries with conservation policies that are not 
comparably effective to be different enough in a relevant respect to justify discrimination 
between them.  See, e.g., 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 121. 
 128 Knox, supra note 20, at 56. 
 129 Id. at 37. 
 130 1998 Appellate Body, supra note 3, para. 159.  Axel Bree also reads this language 
as Knox does.  See Bree, supra note 42, at 119 (“By introducing a balancing test . . ., the 
Appellate Body has opened the door for arguments and requirements that do not 
necessarily need to have a textual basis.”). 
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those words, the Appellate Body will inevitably have to balance 
the opposing interests at stake in deciding which interpretation 
to adopt in resolving the dispute.  The Appellate Body did not, 
however, give itself license to invent requirements without any 
basis in the text of the chapeau.  Such an extraordinary reading 
of paragraph 159 would be inconsistent with the Appellate Body’s 
explicit focus on the ordinary meaning of the text of Article XX.  
Thus, this paragraph does not support the duty to negotiate that 
Knox seeks to derive from the shrimp-turtle rulings, and we are 
left with the conclusion that neither the ordinary meaning of the 
text of the chapeau nor the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the 
chapeau imposes any such duty. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Appellate Body’s rulings in the shrimp-turtle case 
indicates that importing countries can defend environmental 
trade measures, even unilateral import bans, under GATT 
Article XX as long as they avoid unfair discrimination.  These 
unilateral trade measures may justifiably discriminate against 
imports produced by processes that harm natural resources 
located outside the jurisdiction of the importing countries or 
against imports from countries that have environmental policies 
deemed inadequate by the importing country.  The 2001 
Appellate Body ruling, by emphasizing paragraph 121 from the 
1998 Appellate Body ruling so forcefully, confirmed that WTO 
members enjoy a right to restrict imports based on 
environmental standards unilaterally prescribed by the 
importing country and applied to the conservation policies of 
exporting countries. 
The case-by-case approach endorsed by the Appellate Body 
should provide much broader leeway for the use of environmental 
trade measures than suggested by past panel decisions.  Under 
the Article XX chapeau, an exporting country can challenge such 
measures if they are applied in a manner that amounts to “a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries” or “a disguised restriction on international trade.”131  
In particular, the Appellate Body held that to avoid “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination,” the country imposing a ban on 
imports from an exporting country must provide a formal hearing 
that allows the exporting country to argue that it has comparable 
environmental policies even if they are not precisely the same as 
the policies in the importing country, make the same efforts to 
negotiate with all exporting countries, make the same efforts to 
 
 131 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. 
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transfer technology to all exporting countries, and provide a 
formal notice of the reasons for adverse decisions and some 
procedure for review of or appeal from these denials.  By basing 
its scrutiny of environmental trade measures only on 
requirements that are explicit in the text of Article XX of the 
GATT, the Appellate Body strikes a more reasonable balance 
between environmental and trade interests than panels in prior 
decisions have struck. 
The Appellate Body can continue this progress by making 
good on its promise to remain faithful to the ordinary meaning of 
the text of GATT Article XX.  By focusing on that text, we can 
resolve many of the disagreements that have arisen regarding 
the proper interpretation of the Appellate Body’s rulings in the 
shrimp-turtle case.  In particular, the ordinary meaning of that 
text militates against any jurisdictional limitation on the 
conservation exception in Article XX, against a requirement that 
import bans based on the conservation policies of exporting 
countries include shipment-by-shipment exceptions, and against 
an independent duty for importing countries to open negotiations 
with exporting countries before imposing an import ban. 
Closer attention to the text of the GATT would not only 
make for better legal reasoning but also give greater legitimacy 
to WTO rulings.  To impose restrictions on environmental trade 
measures without a basis in the text of Article XX erodes respect 
for the WTO in particular and undermines the political support 
for free trade in general.  In this sense, WTO rulings that are 
more sensitive to environmental interests will also do a better job 
of serving our interest in free trade as well. 
 
